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contact tracing applications to contribute to the process of  lifting the restrictions imposed on its 
citizens. Generally, the protection of  personal data is a right that appears in constitutional and 
legal provisions, and its processing can only be performed under very restricted circumstances, the 
protection of  health being a valid justification. This article focusses on the systems developed as 
digital contact tracing tools in France (StopCovid) and in Portugal (STAYAWAY COVID), 
presenting their characteristics and the most relevant aspects concerning the processing of  personal 
data. The most relevant positive characteristics of  these systems are their voluntary adoption, their 
developers’ concern with the people’s security and privacy, and the transparency of  their functioning. 
With the negative characteristics, the most relevant are the restricted interoperability with the systems 
from other EU countries, and the permanent risk to people’s privacy of  collecting lists of  contacts 
and the circumstances of  their interactions with other users of  the systems.
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1. Introduction
The rapid outbreak of  the SARS-CoV-2 (“COVID-19”), originating in Wuhan, 
China at the end of  2019 and the subsequent declaration of  “pandemic” by the 
World Health Organisation (“WHO”) on March 11, 2020, has necessitated a global 
response to manage the transmission, spread and impact of  the virus.1
To mitigate and contain the viral spread, many countries around the world have, 
in a first moment, turned to restriction orders, such as mandatory quarantines and 
home confinements. As the disease came under some control, they started to lift the 
restrictions. Many countries have been taking several vital measures to contribute to 
this lifting process, some of  which involve the use of  technology.2
Digital innovations to educate, connect, and alert the residents via web and 
mobile application platforms have proliferated around the world. However, like many 
digital applications requiring the processing of  personal data, the digital systems 
developed to fight COVID-19 raise concerns about the balance between public 
health utility and personal privacy. The success of  digital interventions depends on 
the trust they ensure. Striking this balance has been a challenge that needs to be 
overcome, not only for short term COVID-19 response but also for the mid and 
long-term responses to the ensuing post-COVID-19 era.
In that sense, it is expected that many of  these often invasive technological 
measures will be de-escalated when the threat of  COVID-19 is over or will cease 
to be useful, but some will likely be maintained, enhanced, and reoriented for other 
purposes, if  not faced with proper regulation.3
Nevertheless, most digital measures adopted are still recent, being in the first 
stages of  implementation, and have not yet reached their full capacity and impact. It 
is already possible to realise which measures were preferred by most countries and 
analyse the conditions of  its deployment and the possible impact they can have on 
the protection of  personal data.
This article aims to present some of  the technological measures adopted by 
countries worldwide and then, zeroing in on the measures of  digital contact tracing 
(“CT”), present the characteristics and assessments on the processing of  personal 
data performed by the systems adopted in two European Union countries, namely, 
France and Portugal. The reason for choosing these systems, the context of  the 
development, their similarities, and their differences will be expanded upon within 
the different sections of  this paper.
The remainder of  this work is organised as follows: in the next section a literature 
review on the adoption of  measures to tackle the spread of  contagious diseases 
1 Qijun Gao et al., “The epidemiological characteristics of  2019 novel Coronavirus diseases 
(COVID-19) in Jingmen, China”, SSRN, 2020, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3548755.
2 As examples of  measures adopted by some countries, it is possible to refer to China and Singapore, 
which adopted tracking systems through the use of  migration maps and real-time data provided by 
smartphones and wearable devices, and to France, where some cities incorporated facial recognition 
technology to their public transportation video surveillance systems, in order to monitor the use of  masks 
by their citizens. For further information on those technologies, see Sera Whitelaw et al., “Applications 
of  digital technology in COVID-19 pandemic planning and response”, The Lancet Digital Health, v. 2, no. 
8 (August 2020): e435–40, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30142-4; Luis Felipe M. Ramos, 
“Evaluating privacy during the COVID-19 public health emergency: the case of  facial recognition 
technologies”, in Proceedings of  the 13th International Conference on Theory and Practice of  Electronic Governance - 
ICEGOV’20 (Athens, Greece: ACM Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3428502.3428526.
3 Ramos, “Evaluating privacy during the COVID-19 public health emergency”.
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is presented; section 3 presents some data on the measures adopted worldwide to 
battle the COVID-19 pandemic, with focus on the French and Portuguese systems. 
Lastly, section 4 presents some conclusions.
2. Traditional measures against contagious disease
Traditionally, to control the spread of  contagious diseases, many different 
measures can be adopted, from a pharmaceutical approach, like prophylactic 
vaccination and drug treatments, to pre-emptive culling. One possible approach is 
to interrupt the transmission from person to person, which can be achieved through 
the reduction of  epidemiological contact (i.e., social distancing) or through tracing 
the contacts of  known cases (i.e., contact tracing).4
From these measures, epidemiological CT is considered crucial to prevent 
further transmission of  many infectious diseases, from early cases of  novel infectious 
to endemic sexually transmitted infections.5 This occurs due to the human behavior 
of  moving across locations, which contributes to the transmission of  communicable 
diseases, requiring the adoption of  actions that can interrupt this contagious process.6
CT can be defined as identifying and examining relevant contacts of  infectious 
cases (often called index case), performing adequate testing for the presence of  infection 
or disease and, if  necessary, providing of  appropriate therapy before the occurrence of  
serious illness.7 According to the WHO, three basic elements compose CT:8
•	 Contact identification: to identify persons who may have been exposed to 
the disease as a result of  being in contact with an infected person;
•	 Contact listing: to trace and communicate with the identified contacts, and 
to provide information about suitable infection control measures, symptom 
monitoring and other precautionary measures such as the need for quarantine;
•	 Contact follow-up: to monitor the contacts regularly for symptoms.
The adoption of  CT by public health authorities in the context of  controlling 
the outbreak of  COVID-19 has been recommended by the European Centre 
for  Disease Prevention and Control (“ECDC”)9 and the WHO, which provided 
guidelines for its implementation.10
4 Thomas House and Matt J. Keeling, “The impact of  contact tracing in clustered populations”, 
PLoS Computational Biology, v. 6, no. 3 (March 26, 2010): e1000721, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pcbi.1000721.
5 Benjamin Armbruster and Margaret L. Brandeau, “Contact tracing to control infectious disease: when 
enough is enough”, Health Care Management Science, v. 10, no. 4 (December 2007): 341–55, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10729-007-9027-6; Saskia Glasauer et al., “International tuberculosis contact-tracing 
notifications in Germany: analysis of  national data from 2010 to 2018 and implications for efficiency”, 
BMC Infectious Diseases, v. 20, no. 1 (December 2020): 267, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12879-020-04982-z; 
House and Keeling, “The impact of  contact tracing in clustered populations”.
6 Bouke C. de Jong et al., “Ethical considerations for movement mapping to identify disease transmission 
hotspots”, Emerging Infectious Diseases, v. 25, no. 7 (July 2019), https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2507.181421.
7 Glasauer et al., “International tuberculosis contact-tracing notifications in Germany”; Sadamori Kojaku, 
Laurent Hébert-Dufresne and Yong-Yeol Ahn, “The effectiveness of  contact tracing in heterogeneous 
networks”, ArXiv:2005.02362 [Physics, q-Bio], May 5, 2020, http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02362.
8 World Health Organization (WHO), Contact tracing during an outbreak of  Ebola virus disease (Brazzaville, 
Republic of  Congo: World Health Organization, September 2014), http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/ebola/contact-tracing-during-outbreak-of-ebola.pdf.
9 “Contact tracing for COVID-19: current evidence, options for scale-up and an assessment of  resources 
needed”, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), April 2020, https://www.ecdc.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/COVID-19-Contract-tracing-scale-up.pdf.
10 “2019 novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV): strategic preparedness and response plan”, World Health 
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Nonetheless, the traditional CT by following up cases and contacts using 
public health staff  is resource-intensive.11 In this context, the adoption of  solutions 
based on Information and Communication Technologies (“ICT”), such as contact 
management software (e.g., the WHO-provided Go.Data)12 and mobile CT 
applications, can improve the efficiency of  CT methods.13
Nowadays, the use of  personal digital devices is ubiquitous, with an estimate 
8.3 billion mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions worldwide in 2019, representing 
approximately 108 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and 97% of  the world population 
living within reach of  a mobile cellular signal,14 which presents an outstanding tool 
to perform digital CT.
For that reason, we have seen many different systems being deployed worldwide, 
developed by governments, private actors, research institutions, among others. The 
variety of  applications available have been developed using different specifications 
and characteristics, such as different mobile platforms, communication protocols, 
data storage, etc., and for that reason, they must be evaluated considering how much 
attention they pay to data protection.
Even before the outbreak of  COVID-19, several contact tracking applications 
involving mobile applications, wireless technologies, and GPS have been presented in 
the literature15. Considering the increasing concern about the protection of  personal 
data, some of  the most recently released applications propose privacy-oriented 
solutions16. All these tools vary in purpose, features, and complexity.
However, just like the traditional CT methods raise privacy concerns,17 digital 
Organization, March 2, 2020, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/strategic-preparedness-and-
response-plan-for-the-new-coronavirus; “Contact tracing in the context of  COVID-19”, World Health 
Organization (WHO), October 5, 2020, https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1277571/retrieve; 
“Critical preparedness readiness and response actions COVID-19”, World Health Organization (WHO), 
March 22, 2020, https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1272587/retrieve.
11 Alex Berke et al., Assessing disease exposure risk with location data: a proposal for cryptographic preservation of  
privacy, ArXiv:2003.14412 [Cs], April 8, 2020, http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.14412.
12 See: https://www.who.int/godata/about.
13 de Jong et al., “Ethical considerations for movement mapping to identify disease transmission 
hotspots”; “Contact Tracing for COVID-19”, ECDC; Luca Ferretti et al., “Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 
transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing”, Science, v. 368, no. 6491 (May 8, 
2020): eabb6936, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb6936.
14 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Measuring digital development - facts and figures 2019 
(Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union, 2019), https://www.itu.int/en/
ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf.
15 Thamer Altuwaiyan, Mohammad Hadian and Xiaohui Liang, “EPIC: efficient privacy-preserving 
contact tracing for infection detection”, in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 
(Kansas City, MO: IEEE, 2018), 1–6, https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2018.8422886; Lisa O. Danquah 
et al., “Use of  a mobile application for Ebola contact tracing and monitoring in Northern Sierra 
Leone: a proof-of-concept study”, BMC Infectious Diseases, v. 19, no. 1 (December 2019): 810, https://
doi.org/10.1186/s12879-019-4354-z; Emmenual Reddy et al., “Mobile application for Dengue fever 
monitoring and tracking via GPS: case study for Fiji”, ArXiv:1503.00814 [Cs], March 2, 2015, http://
arxiv.org/abs/1503.00814.
16 Alex Berke et al., “Assessing disease exposure risk with location data: a proposal for cryptographic 
preservation of  privacy”, ArXiv:2003.14412 [Cs], April 8, 2020, http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.14412; 
Arvin Hekmati, Gowri Ramachandran and Bhaskar Krishnamachari, “CONTAIN: privacy-oriented 
contact tracing protocols for epidemics”, ArXiv:2004.05251 [Cs], April 10, 2020, http://arxiv.org/
abs/2004.05251.
17 Matthew L Levine, “Contact tracing for HIV infection: a plea for privacy”, Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review, v. 20, no. 1 (1988): 157–202; Randolph F. Wykoff  et al., “Contact tracing to identify human 
immunodeficiency virus infection in a rural community”, JAMA: The Journal of  the American Medical 
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CT presents privacy risks, which must be carefully addressed for individuals to place 
trust in the applications. As these systems deal with personal data, location data, and 
sometimes even special categories of  data, such as health data, they required intense 
scrutiny of  their data protection policies and practices.18
The protection of  privacy for infected persons, besides being a legal requirement 
in most jurisdictions, also represents a critical requirement to facilitate the cooperation 
of  individuals. Risks to privacy from traditional and digital CT vary from data breaches 
to government surveillance. Examples of  governmental mass surveillance can be seen 
in Israel, that approved emergency legislation allowing the government to use sensitive 
data to track coronavirus carriers,19 and in South Korea, that deployed a government-
controlled central database20 that stores tracking data from mobile phones along with 
credit card records, surveillance video and personal interviews with patients in order to 
track the infectious spreading.
In order to mitigate these risks, the European Commission went ahead and issued 
guidelines for apps supporting the fight against COVID-19 pandemic concerning data 
protection,21 while the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) published some 
guidelines on the use of  location data and CT tools.22 The US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has also published some criteria for evaluating digital 
CT tools.23
3. Technological tools deployed to fight COVID-19
As the understanding of  the mechanisms involved in the proliferation of  the virus 
increased and the containment measures presented relevant results in the controlling 
of  the spreading, many countries started developing strategies to lift the restrictions 
imposed on their citizens and turned to digital solutions to contribute to this process.
Concerning the measures deployed worldwide, some of  them may be considered 
more privacy-invasive, while others were adopted with the protection of  personal 
data in mind. On the first group of  measures, it is possible to highlight systems that 
incorporate biometric technologies, especially facial recognition technologies, which, 
Association, v. 259, no. 24 (June 24, 1988): 3563–66, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.259.24.3563.
18 Shakila Bu-Pasha et al., “EU Law perspectives on location data privacy in smartphones and informed 
consent for transparency”, European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), v. 2, no. 3 (2016): 312–23, 
https://doi.org/10.21552/EDPL/2016/3/7; Lawrence O. Gostin, Sam F. Halabi and Kumanan 
Wilson, “Health data and privacy in the digital era”, JAMA, v. 320, no. 3 (July 17, 2018): 233, https://
doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.8374; Effy Vayena et al., “Policy implications of  big data in the health 
sector”, Bulletin of  the World Health Organization, v. 96, no. 1 (December 1, 2018): 66–68, https://doi.
org/10.2471/BLT.17.197426.
19 Emergency Regulations (Authorization of  the General Security Service to Assist the National 
Effort to Reduce the Spread of  the Novel Coronavirus), 5780-2020, available at: https://perma.
cc/96V9-HJSS.
20 “Coronavirus disease-19”, Republic of  Korea, available at: http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en/.
21 “Mobile applications to support contact tracing in the EU’s fight against COVID-19”, eHealth 
Network, April 15, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/covid-19_
apps_en.pdf; European Commission, Communication from the Commission Guidance on Apps 
supporting the fight against COVID 19 pandemic in relation to data protection 2020/C 124 I/01, 
Official Journal of  the European Union 2020; 63:1-9, April 17, 2020.
22 “Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of  location data and contact tracing tools in the context of  the 
COVID-19 outbreak”, European Data Protection Board (EDPB), April 21, 2020, https://edpb.europa.
eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf.
23 “Digital contact tracing tools for COVID-19”, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
April 20, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/digital-contact-tracing.pdf.
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by its characteristics, present a high risk of  personal data violations.24 On the other 
hand, less invasive systems adopted by many countries consist of  web platforms or 
mobile applications, presenting different features, such as self-diagnostic/medical 
reporting, CT, and quarantine enforcement/isolation registration or monitoring 
functions.
Although digital CT applications are being adopted widely by many countries as 
a complementary tool to help in the process of  lifting the restriction measures imposed 
on the general population, it is important to highlight the concerns recently expressed 
by the WHO, for whom these technologies still need to prove their effectiveness and 
their feasibility and thresholds required for large scale implementation.25
As a result of  research performed during June 2020 concerning the deployment 
of  technological tools, 158 systems were identified from 94 countries, and two 
systems were categorised as global because they were developed by a supranational 
institution (WHO) and an international coalition. This dataset includes web platforms 
and mobile applications developed to disseminate information or assist people 
in checking COVID-19 symptoms. Focusing on mobile applications that process 
personal data, 139 apps were identified. Of  those, 122 were in use at the time of  
the research, while six were in the pilot phase, nine were announced but not yet 
made available, and two have been discontinued. Of  the identified systems, 48 were 
developed by 28 European countries, being 20 European Union Member States.
In many countries, the protection of  personal data is a right that appears in 
constitutional and legal provisions, and its processing can only be performed under 
very restricted circumstances, the protection of  health being accepted as a valid 
justification.
In this paper , we will focus on the systems developed as digital CT tools in 
France (StopCovid) and in Portugal (STAYAWAY COVID). In the next section, the 
author will outline their characteristics and the most relevant aspects concerning the 
processing of  personal data.
These systems were chosen based on the existence of  a consistent legal 
framework for data protection in these countries, and because their development 
was closely monitored by France’s and Portugal’s national data protection authorities. 
Also, these systems were developed using different technical protocols, which 
resulted in relevant differences on the processing of  personal data.
3.1. StopCovid
On 8 April 2020, the French government announced its intention to release a 
digital CT tool, denominated StopCovid. This tool is considered by the government 
a necessary measure to protect the population and is part of  France’s global 
deconfinement plan.
The official application’s website26 states that this technological solution is part 
of  a gradual plan of  epidemic control aimed at loosening the imposed restrictions 
and seeking to inform citizens that have been in the vicinity of  carriers of  the virus 
in the near past.
24 Ramos, “Evaluating privacy during the COVID-19 public health emergency”.
25 “Digital tools for COVID-19 contact tracing”, World Health Organization (WHO), June 2, 2020, 
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Contact_Tracing-Tools_Annex-2020.1.
26 “TousAntiCovid”, Ministère de l´Économie des Finances et de la Relance, available at: https://
www.economie.gouv.fr/stopcovid#.
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It consists, on the users’ side, of  an application for smartphones and mobile 
devices, running Android or iOS operating systems, and on the government’s side, of  
a central server that stores and transmits the data necessary for the overall operation 
of  the system.
The application is based on the ROBERT protocol (ROBust and privacy-
presERving proximity Tracing), which is responsible for building a comprehensive 
list of  users of  the application that had close contact with each other for at least a 
specific time interval. The ROBERT protocol was developed by a joint effort between 
French Inria and German Fraunhofer Heinrich Institut, with data minimisation and 
data protection by design in mind , and had its source code published on the Internet27, 
allowing for an independent audit of  its functioning. Also, the complete source 
code of  the StopCovid application has been made available online,28 reinforcing the 
government’s compliance with transparency.
Although not involving identification data directly (i.e., name, telephone number, 
e-mail address, etc.), it generates pseudonyms used as identifiers of  each person that 
installed the application. As these pseudonyms can be linked to each installation, it 
can be considered as personal data within the meaning of  Article 4(1) of  the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).29 Also, as the alert provided by the 
system is triggered by the information that a person presents a sufficiently high 
risk of  having contracted COVID-19, this data can be considered as concerning 
health and thus benefits from the specific protection regime for such sensitive data 
provided by Article 9 of  the GDPR.
This system is not considered a tracking application, as it does not rely on 
the use of  geolocation data to assess the proximity between two electronic devices, 
but instead uses Bluetooth Low Energy communication technology to perform 
this assessment. This characteristic avoids the surveillance of  people’s geographical 
movements, as it does not continuously trace individuals.
The use of  StopCovid is on a completely voluntary basis, not imposing any 
negative burdens on people who decide not to install the application, or after 
installing it, decide not to connect or provide information on their health status. 
It was developed in a way that presents many opportunities for people to choose 
sharing their personal data: they can have carte blanche to install the application 
(or not), enable the Bluetooth function on their devices (or not), or even declare 
their positive result to COVID-19 in the application (or not). Also, they can request 
the complete exclusion of  their data and remove the application at any time. The 
system is aimed at the population residing in French territory, and the voluntary 
downloading and use is guaranteed by the legal framework governing the system.
The GDPR, in its Article 6, establishes a restricted list of  hypotheses for lawfully 
processing personal data. It is important to highlight that the Regulation does not 
establish any hierarchy between the listed legal basis, being the responsibility of  the 
entity carrying out the processing to determine which one better fits its objectives.
Among the possibilities presented on the Regulation, a digital CT application 
like StopCovid could be deployed under the consent of  the data subjects or the 
27 “Robert”, GitHub, available at: https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents.
28 https://gitlab.inria.fr/stopcovid19.
29 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016 on the 
protection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement 
of  such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
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performance of  a task carried out in the public interest. However, if  the processing 
is based on the public interest, Article 6(3) of  the GDPR demands that this legal 
basis is laid down by Union law or a Member State law to which the controller is 
subject.
The fight against COVID-19 undoubtedly represents a public interest, and for 
that reason, the French government considered that the most appropriate legal basis 
for the implementation of  the StopCovid application was the provision of  Article 6(1)
(e) of  the GDPR. To fulfill the requirement of  the Regulation, the government issued 
the Decree nº 2020-650, of  29 May 2020,30 which designates the Ministry of  Health 
as the data controller of  the application, and defines the purposes of  the processing 
as: (i) to inform people using the application that there is a risk that they have been 
contaminated by the Covid-19 virus due to the fact that they are near another user 
of  this application having been diagnosed positive, (ii) to educate people using the 
application, in particular those identified as contacts at risk of  contamination, on the 
symptoms of  this virus, the barrier gestures and the conduct to be adopted to fight 
against its spread, (iii) to recommend to contacts at risk of  contamination to refer 
to the competent health professionals for the purpose of  taking care of  them and 
prescribing, if  necessary, a screening examination, and (iv) to adapt, if  necessary, the 
definition of  the application parameters making it possible to identify contacts at 
risk of  contamination through the use of  anonymous statistical data at national level.
This national legislation also sets a deadline for the processing of  the collected 
data, which may not exceed six months after the cessation of  the state of  health 
emergency, declared by Law nº 2020-290, of  23 March 2020, and extended until 30 
October, by Law nº 2020-856, of  09 July 2020.
During the development stage of  StopCovid, the government submitted consults 
to the French data protection authority, CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et 
des Libertés), which provided valuable remarks to improve the protection of  personal 
data processed by the application, praising the government’s concern to protect 
people’s privacy, since the application respects the concept of  data protection by 
design and by default. 
On its deliberations of  24 April 202031 and 25 May 2020,32 CNIL pointed as 
positive aspects of  the approach adopted by the French government, the concern 
to protect people’s privacy, in particular, by preventing a list of  people who declare 
themselves as carriers of  the virus to be kept centralised on a server. Also, CNIL 
recognised that the safeguards taken during the development of  the application 
provide a high degree of  guarantee, therefore minimising the risk of  re-identification 
of  the data subjects associated with the data stored, for a necessarily limited period, 
by the central server, in full compliance with the principles of  data protection enlisted 
on Article 5 of  the GDPR.
30 Décret no. 2020-650 du 29 mai 2020 relatif  au traitement de données dénommé «StopCovid».
31 “Deliberation no. 2020-046 of  April 24, 2020 delivering an opinion on a proposed mobile 
application called ‘StopCovid’ (request for opinion no. 20006919)”, CNIL, April 24, 2020, https://
www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/deliberation_of_april_24_2020_delivering_an_opinion_
on_a_proposed_mobile_application_called_stopcovid.pdf.
32 “Deliberation no. 2020-056 from 25 May 2020 delivering an opinion on a draft decree relating to the 
mobile application known as ‘StopCovid’”, CNIL, May 25, 2020, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/deliberation_ndeg_2020-056_from_25_may_2020_delivering_an_opinion_on_a_
draft_decree_relating_to_the_mobile_application_known_as_stopcovid.pdf.
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The compliance with the personal data protection principles, in particular, the 
proper information of  the persons concerned, the respect of  their rights and, more 
generally, of  the provisions of  the GDPR and the French Data Protection Act, is 
likely to promote the confidence of  the users of  the application and, consequently, 
the effectiveness of  the planned system.
In its deliberations, CNIL also highlighted the importance of  the voluntary 
approach, the fact that the government made the deployment, the precise definition 
of  the purposes of  the data collection, and the existence of  a date to cease the 
operation of  the app as decisive factors to ensure there is confidence in the system 
and to encourage its adoption by a significant proportion of  the population.
Nevertheless, regarding the system’s effectiveness, the CNIL draws attention 
to the system’s limitations. On the one hand, there are technical conditions to be 
addressed, in particular, the possibility of  adoption by a sufficient portion of  the 
population to access and use the application under good conditions, which means 
the availability of  the system on a sufficient number of  mobile application stores and 
compatibility with the majority of  mobile devices currently in use, both in terms of  
hardware and software.
On the other hand, it is essential to notice that a portion of  the population may 
not possess adequate mobile devices to install the application or may have difficulties 
installing and using it. In particular, people most vulnerable to the disease, such as 
the elderly or children, or people without any kind of  mobile device, but who can 
significantly contribute to the spread of  the disease, must be particularly concerned. 
Also, some people may contract the disease without presenting any symptoms, which 
may result in them not alerting their contacts.
These limitations must be adequately addressed because the temporary invasion 
of  privacy imposed by the implementation of  the system can only be accepted to the 
point where the government has sufficient information to have reasonable assurance 
that such a measure will be useful in managing the COVID-19 crisis, and bringing 
the population out of  its mandatory confinement, which in itself  constitutes a severe 
infringement of  the freedom of  movement.
As a negative aspect of  the overall system, CNIL pointed out that competition 
from other digital CT applications being developed by different actors is likely to 
undermine the French system’s effectiveness. Also, as a weakness, the CNIL pointed 
to a possible difficulty in interoperability with applications from other EU Member 
States, as France has opted to adopt the ROBERT protocol, which made it a unique 
system in Europe.
Finally, the CNIL recommended that the system’s impact on the overall health 
strategy be studied and documented regularly so that the effectiveness over time 
can be assessed. This becomes more important because, between the release of  the 
application on 2 June 2020, and the three following weeks, more than 1.9 million 
people downloaded the application and more than 1.8 million activated the system, 
but only 68 users declared a positive COVD-19 test result, and the application sent 
only 14 notifications to related contacts,33 which demonstrates that, in general, people 
may still not trust this kind of  application.
33 Romain Dillet, “French contact-tracing app StopCovid has been activated 1.8 million times but only 
sent 14 notifications”, TechCrunch, June 23, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/23/french-
contact-tracing-app-stopcovid-has-been-activated-1-8-million-times-but-only-sent-14-notifications/.
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3.2. STAYAWAY COVID
In Portugal, the development of  a digital CT application was announced at the 
end of  April 2020, by a joint initiative between a private research institution, INESC 
TEC (Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores, Tecnologia e Ciência), and a non-
profit public association, ISPUP (Instituto de Saúde Pública da Universidade do Porto). 
Although not directly involved in the project, the Portuguese national government 
endorsed its development.
The official application’s website34 states that this technological solution aims 
to be a complementary measure, within the framework of  a comprehensive strategy 
to combat the pandemic. It intends to assist people in taking measures to interrupt 
the transmission chain of  the infection, by alerting its users of  any close contact that 
person may have had with another user who received a positive diagnosis. 
The application was developed within the scope of  the DP^3T (Decentralised 
Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) project,35 an international consortium of  
European researchers, who built a proximity tracing system to be applied at large 
scale, aiming to minimise privacy and security risks for its users and guarantee the 
highest level of  data protection.
It consists, on the users’ side, of  an application for smartphones and mobile 
devices, running Android or iOS operating systems, and on the other side, by two 
different servers, one responsible for diagnosis authentication (SLD – Serviço de 
Legitimação de Diagnóstico) and the other responsible for diagnosis publication (SPD – 
Serviço de Publicação de Diagnóstico).
The SLD generates a 12 characters code that is provided to the authorised 
health professional responsible for the medical examination that returned a positive 
diagnosis for COVID-19, and who is responsible for delivering it to the patient, who 
can then insert the code into the application to inform of  his or hers health status. It 
also registers the date of  the patient’s first symptoms or, in the case of  asymptomatic 
patients, the testing date. If  during the 24 hours of  validity of  the code provided by 
the SLD server, the patient inserts it in the STAYAWAY COVID application, then 
the SPD server receives an identifier from the mobile device, known as temporary 
exposure key (TEK), and then matches this identifier with all other users that came 
into close contact with the infected patient, sending them a notification of  the risk 
of  contagion.
Along with the notification, the user receives varying information on how to 
proceed next, according to the level of  proximity she or he had with the infected 
patient. 
The application is based on the Exposure Notification framework provided 
by the software developers Google and Apple, consisting of  a protocol that allows 
CT applications to access some functionalities of  the device’s operating system, and 
that had its technical specifications and Application Programming Interface (“API”) 
published on the Internet.36 Although these specifications are not as informative 
as the complete source code of  the protocol, they still allow for some independent 
34 “Stayaway COVID”, Direção-Geral da Saúde, República Portuguesa, available at: https://stayaway.
inesctec.pt/.
35 “DP^3T - Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing”, GitHub, available at: https://
github.com/DP-3T.
36 See the sites: https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/ and https://www.google.com/
covid19/exposurenotifications/.
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audit of  its functioning. Also, the complete source code of  the STAYAWAY COVID 
application has been made available online,37 reinforcing the developers’ compliance 
with transparency.
It is important to highlight that Google and Apple announced that access to 
the protocol would be conceded to public health authorities exclusively, and only one 
application per country would be accepted. This requirement made the Portuguese 
national government endorse the development of  the STAYAWAY COVID 
application.
Although not involving identification data directly (i.e., name, telephone 
number, e-mail address, etc.), it generates temporary exposure key (“TEK”) and 
rolling proximity identifiers (“RPI”) that are used as random identifiers of  each 
person that installed the application. As these TEK and RPI can be linked to each 
installation, it can be considered personal data within the meaning of  Article 4(1) of  
the GDPR. Also, as the alert provided by the system is triggered by the information 
that a person presents a sufficiently high risk of  having contracted COVID-19, this 
data can be considered as concerning health and thus benefits from the specific 
protection regime for such sensitive data provided by Article 9 of  the GDPR.
As with the French application, it is not considered tracking , as it does not 
rely on the use of  geolocation data to assess the proximity between two electronic 
devices, but instead, it uses the less intrusive Bluetooth Low Energy communication 
technology to perform this assessment. This characteristic allows the system to fulfill 
its goal without knowing the user’s physical location or where the contact with other 
users took place.
The use of  STAYAWAY COVID is in a completely voluntary and self-
determining basis, not imposing any negative burdens on people who decide not 
to install the application, or after installing it, decide not to connect or provide 
information on their health status. It was developed in a way that presents many 
opportunities for people to choose sharing their personal data. People can install the 
application (or not), enable the Bluetooth function on their devices (or not), or even 
declare their positive result to COVID-19 in the application (or not). Also, they can 
request the complete exclusion of  their data and remove the application at any time.
As previously referred, the GDPR, on its Article 6, establishes a restricted list 
of  hypotheses for lawfully processing personal data. In the case of  the STAYAWAY 
COVID application, the legal basis was the provision of  Article 6(1)(a) in conjunction 
of  Article 9(2)(i) of  the GDPR, consisting of  the data subject consent to the 
processing of  his or her personal data, including special categories of  personal data, 
namely, data concerning health. 
In order to specify the data controller responsible for the processing of  the 
collected data, the government issued the Decree-Law no. 52/2020, of  11 August,38 
designating the DGS (Direção Geral de Saúde) as the entity responsible for the data 
processing, and regulating the intervention of  the health professional on the system, 
in accordance with Article 9(2)(i) of  the GDPR.39 It also defined the purpose of  
37 “Stayaway - The official COVID-19 exposure notification app for Portugal”, GitHub, available at: 
https://github.com/stayawayinesctec.
38 Decreto-Lei no. 52/2020, de 11 de agosto, estabelece o responsável pelo tratamento dos dados e 
regula a intervenção do médico no sistema STAYAWAY COVID.
39 Article 9(2)(i) of  the GDPR requires that Member States law shall establishes the entity responsible 
for the processing of  special categories of  personal data, which includes data concerning health, 
providing for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of  the data subject. 
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the processing as to notify people of  individual exposure to contagious factors for 
SARS-CoV-2, due to close contact with other users of  the application that lately 
received a positive diagnosis of  COVID-19. This national legislation also sets a 
deadline for the processing of  the collected data, which may end with the cessation 
of  the epidemic situation.
During the development stage of  STAYAWAY COVID, its developers submitted 
a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) to the Portuguese data protection 
authority, CNPD (Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados), which provided valuable 
remarks to further protect the processing of  personal data by the application, praising 
the developers’ concern to protect people’s privacy, since the application respects the 
concept of  data protection by design and by default. 
On its deliberation of  29 June 202040 and its Opinion of  21 July 2020,41 CNPD 
pointed as positive aspects of  the approach adopted by the application developers, 
the concern to protect people’s privacy, in particular by preventing a list of  people 
who declare themselves as carriers of  the virus to be kept centralized on a server. 
Also, CNPD recognised that the safeguards taken during the development of  the 
application provide a high degree of  guarantee, therefore minimising the risk of  re-
identification of  the data subjects associated with the data stored, for a necessarily 
limited period, in full compliance with the principles of  data protection set out in 
Article 5 of  the GDPR.
The compliance with the personal data protection principles, in particular the 
proper information of  the persons concerned, the respect of  their rights and, more 
generally, of  the provisions of  the GDPR, is likely to promote the confidence of  the 
users of  the application and, consequently, the effectiveness of  the planned system.
In its deliberations, CNPD also highlighted the importance of  the voluntary 
approach, the availability of  the application’s source code, the precise definition of  
the purposes of  the data collection, and the existence of  a date to cease the operation 
of  the app as decisive factors to ensure the confidence in the system and encourage 
its adoption by a significant proportion of  the population.
However, CNPD also pointed out that, although not having to register to use 
the applications, the users must be registered on Google’s or Apple’s application 
marketplaces to download the STAYAWAY COVID app. This authentication process 
results in personal data being provided to those companies, who then have a full 
register of  all persons that adopted the system.
As a negative aspect of  the overall system, CNPD pointed out that the adoption 
of  the Bluetooth technology does not represent a complete protection of  the user’s 
identity or location, as it can still be traced back to the mobile device’s MAC (Media 
Access Control) address, which is a unique identifier of  the equipment. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to mask the MAC address with a random value, the technical specifications 
of  the Exposure Notification framework raise concerns regarding the possibility of  
Google or Apple – who shall maintain a register of  the real MAC address - to follow 
a track of  the contacts or even revert the masking process.
In the Portuguese law, although the DGS was selected as data controller, CNPD criticized that choice, 
stating on its Parecer/2020/82 that the data controller should be an authority with legal duties and 
powers, which would be the Health Director-General, and not the public office.
40 “Deliberação/2020/277”, CNPD, June 29, 2020, https://www.cnpd.pt/home/decisoes/Delib/
DEL_2020_277.pdf.
41 “Parecer/2020/82”, CNPD, July 21, 2020, https://www.cnpd.pt/home/decisoes/Par/PAR_2020_82.
pdf.
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Also, since the Exposure Notification framework is property of  private 
companies, there is a risk of  unilateral modifications of  the system without previous 
notice to its users and without any guarantee that the data will not be used for different 
purposes than initially specified, with negative consequences for the application and 
the users.
Finally, CNPD recommended conducting a pilot test, under real conditions, 
restricted to a portion of  the national territory, to identify and correct security flaws. 
This pilot test commenced on August 17, 2020 and lasted for two weeks. The official 
release of  the applications occurred on September 1, 2020, and during the first month 
of  operations, the system registered more than 1.26 million downloads, and provided 
106 notifications of  contacts with people that tested positive for COVID-19.42
4. Conclusion
The adoption of  digital CT applications as complementary measures to 
contribute to the end of  the restrictions imposed by many countries to its citizens 
should be recognised as relevant and greeted as a new tool to be deployed in a 
globalised world.
The COVID-19 pandemic came disrupting many aspects of  our regular lives 
and imposing the adoption of  new behaviors. Although not yet rooted in our routines, 
the use of  mobile devices to report health conditions is being strongly incentivised.
In this paper, we aimed to briefly assess this new reality and present the systems 
developed in France and Portugal to notify people of  the risk of  having been in close 
contact with someone who came to receive a positive diagnosis for COVID-19.
The most relevant characteristic of  both systems is their voluntary approach, 
allowing people to try the applications and develop trust in the systems. As these 
systems can only fulfill their objectives through the processing of  personal data, it is 
paramount that every user can trust the application.
This trust is reinforced by the transparency that both systems present, having 
made available their source codes so any interested party can audit its functioning and 
report any identified issues, contributing to the overall improvement of  the systems.
It is also relevant to notice that the two systems present a specific deadline to 
cease their operations, determined by the legislation that grants the legal basis for 
their general functioning.
As digital CT applications are relatively new systems, it is essential to have an 
overview by the national data protection authorities of  each country interested in 
deploying this kind of  system. That was observed in the French and Portuguese 
cases, where both CNIL and CNPD actively participated in the development, 
providing relevant recommendations and guidelines to increase the protection of  
people’s privacy.
Concerning the French application, both the government and the protocol 
developers have already referred to the intention of  evolving the system to enable 
EU-wide interoperability, which would represent an increase in the system’s efficiency. 
However, they may result in new privacy risks that must be adequately addressed.
In a comparison between the two systems, it seems that the Portuguese may 
easily provide future interoperability with applications from other countries, based 
42 “Mais de um milhão de pessoas já instalaram a aplicação StayAway Covid”, SIC Notícias, October, 
02, 2020, https://sicnoticias.pt/especiais/coronavirus/2020-10-02-Mais-de-um-milhao-de-pessoas-
ja-instalaram-a-aplicacao-StayAway-Covid.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 6, No. 2,  July 2020
48 Luis Felipe Miranda Ramos
on the Exposure Notification framework that has been adopted by many other 
digital CTtools. 
However, the STAYAWAY COVID application developers do not hold full 
control of  the data processing, as part of  the system runs code that cannot be 
audited. On the other hand, the French application, because it is based on a different 
protocol, that strives for transparency, may provide greater security and privacy for 
its users.
The interoperability of  CT applications within the European Union has 
recently been discussed by its Member States, which agreed on a set of  technical 
specifications43 that any system must observe to allow the exchange of  information 
between different national applications when users travel through the EU.
As any novel system, it is expected that during the use of  these systems, some 
flaws may be identified, as some other points that can be improved to deliver greater 
personal data protection.
43 “EHealth network guidelines to the EU Member States and the European Commission on 
interoperability specifications for cross-border transmission chains between approved apps”, eHealth 
Network, June 12, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/mobileapps_
interoperabilityspecs_en.pdf.
